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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brian Draper appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction imposing a 
fixed-life sentence for first degree murder, and a life sentence, with thirty years fixed, for 
conspiracy to commit murder. In the Revised Appellant's Brief1 Brian argued that, (1) 
his rights to due process of law and to a jury trial where denied by the district court 
reducing the State's burden of proof by giving the jury an ambiguous instruction on first-
degree murder and by instructing the jury that it did not have to find a necessary 
element of the crime of conspiracy, (2) the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress, (3) the repeated errors resulted in cumulative error, (4) the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) should be disregarded and a new report 
prepared because the report was biased and he was not allowed to have a parent 
present during questioning by the presentence investigator, (5) his sentences, 
particularly his fixed life sentence, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 
United States and/or Idaho Constitutions, (6) the district court abused its discretion 
when it sentenced him to a fixed life sentence and a sentence of life, with thirty years 
fixed, in light of his age, potential for rehabilitation, remorse, and the offers of help and 
promises of leniency he received from police prior to confessing, and (7) the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 
35) motion in light of the new and additional information presented. 
1 The Revised Appellant's Brief is the Appellant's Brief filed with this Court on March 25, 
2010. 
1 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments on appeal that 
several of the issues raised in the Revised Appellant's Brief were not raised below, as 
well as address several of the State's arguments regarding the sentencing issues raised 
by Brian in light of the United States Supreme Court's Opinion in Graham v. Florida. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Brian's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court deny Brian his rights to due process of law and to a jury trial 
when it reduced the State's burden of proof by giving the jury an ambiguous 
instruction on first-degree murder and by instructing the jury that it did not have to 
find a necessary element of the crime of conspiracy? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Brian's motion to suppress because his 
due process rights were violated when he was coerced into confeSSing to officers 
involuntarily? 
3. Did the repeated errors in this case result in cumulative error depriving Brian of a 
fair trial? 
4. Should the Presentence Investigation Report in Brian's case be disregarded and 
a new Presentence Investigation Report prepared because it was biased and 
because Brian was not allowed to have a parent present during questioning by 
the presentence investigator? 
5. Do Brian's sentences, particularly his fixed-life sentence, constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the United States and/or Idaho Constitutions because 
he was a juvenile when the offense was committed? 
6. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Brian to a fixed life 
sentence for murder in the first degree and a sentence of life, with thirty years 
fixed, for conspiracy to commit murder in light of Brian's age, potential for 
rehabilitation, remorse, and the offers of help and promises of leniency he 
received from police prior to confessing? 
7. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Brian's Rule 35 motion in 




The District Court Denied Brian His Rights To Due Process Of Law And To A JUry Trial 
When It Reduced The State's Burden Of Proof By Giving The JUry An Ambiguous 
Instruction On First-Degree Murder And By Instructing The JUry That It Did Not Have To 
Find A Necessary Element Of The Crime Of Conspiracy 
The appellant has determined that no reply is needed to the State's arguments 
on this issue and refers the court back to the arguments made in the Revised 
Appellant's Brief. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Brian's Motion To Suppress Because His Due 
Process Rights Were Violated When He Was Coerced Into Confessing To Officers 
Involuntarily 
In response to Brian's argument that he was coerced into confessing to officers 
involuntarily, the State argues that this argument is not preserved for appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.38-40.) Although ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal, issues that have been argued to or decided by the trial court are 
preserved for appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550,553, 961 P.2d 641,644 (1998). 
Here, the parties below argued that Brian's confession was not voluntary, and the 
district court found that it was voluntary. Furthermore, these arguments and findings 
specifically encompassed whether Brian's confession was coerced. 
The parties below clearly argued that Brian's confession was 
involuntarylvoluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances. Below defense counsel 
argued that Brian's will was overborne by the time of his fourth confession by the 
officers. (Tr. Vol. 8, p.221, Ls.8-20.) Similarly, the prosecutor cited State v. Doe, 137 
Idaho 519 (2002), stating that the case spells out the criteria the court must look at 
4 
when determining "whether a confession is voluntary" including the criteria for when the 
defendant's will is overborne. (Tr. Vol. 8, p.210, L.19 - p.211, L.19.) After submitting 
the evidence the prosecutor also argued, interchangeably, both that the confession was 
voluntary and that Brian waived his Miranda rights. (See Tr. Vol. 8, p.210, L.19 - p.216, 
L.25.) Likewise, the defense argued that Brian did not knowingly and intelligently waive 
his Miranda rights, and also argued that, by the fourth confession, his will was 
overborne. (See Tr. Vol. 8, p.220, L.24 - p.223, L.2.) Additionally, throughout the 
proceedings below, the State specifically urged the court to look at the other evidence 
presented, such as the videotapes, when analyzing the case stating "there is other 
evidence besides what just what is presented here today that the Court can consider in 
deciding this motion to suppress." (Tr. Vol. 8, p.223, Ls.9-15; see also p.215, Ls.1-14.) 
Therefore, the issue was argued by the parties below. 
Furthermore, the district court also found that Brian's confession was voluntary 
and not coerced. When ruling on Brian's motion to suppress the district court cited the 
case law dealing with involuntary confessions as well as involuntary waivers of Miranda 
without noting any distinction between the two. (R., pp.502-504.) The court found that 
even if Brian was not informed of his right to have his parents present "this fact is not 
enough to suppress the confession if other factors indicate that the confession was 
voluntary." (R., p.505.) The court also found that the length of the detention for the 
interview did not result in Brian forfeiting his will to vulnerability or fatigue. (R., pp.507-
08.) Most importantly, in its conclusions of law the district court specifically found that 




Therefore, whether Brian's confession was voluntary or coerced, was clearly 
argued to the district court and/or decided by the district court below, and should be 
considered on appeal. (See R., pp.500-10; Appellant's Brief, p.39.) 
III. 
The Repeated Errors In This Case Resulted In Cumulative Error Depriving Brian Of A 
Fair Trial 
The appellant has determined that no reply is needed to the State's arguments 
on this issue and refers the court back to the arguments made in the Revised 
Appellant's Brief. 
IV. 
The Sentences Should Be Vacated, The Presentence Investigation Report Should Be 
Disregarded, And A New Presentence Investigation Report Should Be Prepared 
Because The Report Was Biased And Because Brian Was Not Allowed To Have A 
Parent Present During Questioning By The Presentence Investigator 
A. Introduction 
In the Revised Appellant's Brief, Brian argued that the district court erred in 
refusing to disregard the presentence report and order a new report because the report 
was biased, and that the district court erred in rescinding the order allowing one of 
Brian's parents to be present at the presentence interview. In the Respondent's Brief, 
the State argues that these issues are not preserved for appeal because they were not 
raised below on the same grounds they are being raised on appeal. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.42-58.) Therefore this section will address whether these issues are preserved 
for appeal, as well as the State's assertion that the presentence investigator's questions 
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were reasonable. Brian refers this Court to his Revised Appellant's Brief for his 
arguments in response to the remaining arguments raised by the State. 
B. Whether Brian's Presentence Investigation Report Was Biased Was Argued 
Below And Has Been Preserved For Appeal 
In response to Brian's argument that the presentence investigation report did not 
conform with Idaho Criminal Rule 32, the State argues that the arguments raised in the 
Appellant's Brief "were not raised below on the same grounds he now presents on 
appeal." (Respondent's Brief, p.42.) The State further explained, that "[e]ven though 
[Brian's] written objection asserted the PSI investigator conducted improper 'police 
investigations,' [Brian's] trial counsel did not follow up on that allegation at the 
sentencing hearing, thus preventing the trial court from considering and ruling on it." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.45-46.) The State further argues that at the sentencing 
hearing, Brian's objection was based solely on the investigator's alleged failure to 
contact family members. (Respondent's Brief, pA6.) However, a review of the record 
clearly indicates that this issue was preserved below and the State's assertion that the 
only argument raised by Brian's counsel was the failure to interview family members 
misrepresents what occurred. 
Prior to sentencing in this case, counsel for Brian filed an objection to the PSI 
stating "Rather than conducting a neutral and objective investigation [the investigator] 
engaged in police investigations contrary to the criminal rule and case decisions of the 
state of Idaho." (R., pp.791-92; See a/so Respondent's Brief, p.43.) As noted by the 
State, at the sentencing hearing, counsel for Brian argued: 
Pursuant to the rule, we don't feel the presentence is valid. According to 
the Rule, it's supposed to be objective. I think based on the testimony [of] 
7 
the witnesses that were called, there is very little if no contact with the 
family other than mom and dad. We think that the presentence is 
slanted-is basically pointed towards the law enforcement version without 
balance and for those reasons and pursuant to the Idaho Criminal Rule, 
we would object to the presentence report, and we would ask the Court to 
order a new report with a different presentence investigator-possibly 
outside this district because of all of the emotion and publicity so that we 
can get a neutral and objective assessment of that. 
(Tr. Vol. 9, p.2294, L.13 - p.2295, L.4; Respondent's Brief, p.44.) Although Brian's 
counsel did argue that other family members had not been contacted by the 
investigator, this argument is clearly not the only argument made by counsel. 
(Tr. Vol. 9, p.2294, L.13 - p.2295, L.4.) Counsel below also clearly stated that the 
presentence report was not objective and noted that in addition to no contact with other 
family members, the presentence report was "slanted" and "pointed toward the law 
enforcement version without balance." (Tr. Vol. 9, p.2294, L.13 - p.2295, L.4.) 
Furthermore, this argument that the PSI was slanted and biased toward the law 
enforcement version was completely consistent with what was argued in defense 
counsel's earlier motion that "[r]ather than conducting a neutral and objective 
investigation [the investigator] engaged in police investigations contrary to the criminal 
rule and case decisions of the state of Idaho." (See R., pp.791-92.) 
Nothing in the record indicates that Brian's counsel abandoned the argument that 
the investigator engaged in police investigations as the State asserts, but rather the 
language used by defense counsel appears to reassert that the investigator was not 
unbiased and objective, but was biased towards law enforcement and engaged in her 
own slanted investigation. Additionally, these arguments below are completely 
consistent with Brian's argument on appeal that the presentence investigation report 
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was biased and that the presentence investigator abandoned her role as a neutral fact 
finder. (See Revised Appellant's Brief, pp.42-47.) 
Finally, the State argues that: 
When [Brian's] trial counsel was given the opportunity to explain his 
objections to the PSI report at the sentencing hearing, he did not cite any 
question or comment as inappropriate, he did not reveal how the report 
was slanted or pointed towards the law enforcement version, and he did 
not inform the court that he was generally challenging the questions asked 
by the investigator, much less that he was claiming the questions 
constituted 'police investigations.' 
(Respondent's Brief, p.46.) This argument by the State seems to imply that for the 
issues raised in the Appellant's Brief to be preserved, Brian's counsel would have had 
to articulate every question or comment by the presentence investigator he disagreed 
with. The State cites no authority stating that to object to a PSI as biased the individual 
must cite every biased statement made. Furthermore, the assertion made by Brian's 
counsel was that the entire tone of the PSI was biased and that the investigator was not 
neutral and detached, but was biased towards law enforcement in her investigation. 
Ultimately, the entire PSI is at issue and not individual statements. Although counsel on 
appeal cited numerous statements made in the PSI, to help demonstrate why the 
investigation was biased, the entire PSI and its tone and statements should be 
considered when determining whether the investigation conformed with Idaho Criminal 
Rule 32, and counsel has not asserted otherwise. Notably, in analyzing the issue 
below, the district court clearly analyzed the entire report, finding that the although the 
investigation was "perhaps not perfect", it conformed with Idaho Criminal Rule 32. 
(Tr. Vo1.2, p.2296, Ls.11-19); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 
641, 644 (1998) (finding that although ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time 
9 
on appeal, issues that have been argued to or decided by the trial court, are preserved 
for appeal). 
Therefore, the issue of whether the presentence investigation report was biased 
and failed to conform with Idaho Criminal Rule 32 was clearly before the district court 
and the issue is preserved for appeal. 
C. The Questions Asked By The Investigator Were Not "Reasonable" Or "Well 
Within The Scope of Idaho Criminal Rule 32" As The State Asserts 
The State also asserts that the questions asked by the investigator were 
reasonable and well within the scope of Rule 32, arguing that it is not only the 
investigator's job to give the defendant's version of events, but to analyze the 
defendant's condition as well. (See Respondent's Brief, PP.47-49.) In support of this 
argument the State cites State v. Dowalo, 122 Idaho 761, 763-64, 838 P.2d 890, 892-
93. In Dowalo, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling that the 
presentence investigator's descriptions of the defendant as "manipulative", "not honest 
on several issues", and not accepting of responsibility were the investigator's opinion as 
to the defendant's broad mental and psychological factors under Idaho Criminal Rule 
32(b)(10). Id. 
Even if such statements fall under 32(b)(10) as descriptions of the psychological 
factors surrounding the crime or the defendant individually, the investigators actions in 
this case were not mere descriptions of the defendant's psychological condition. The 
investigator did not simply give her impression of whether Brian was being truthful, 
manipulative, or accepted responsibility, but was using her role as a neutral investigator 
to conduct a biased investigation, which consisted of asking Brian pointed and detailed 
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questions about the crime and in a manner more akin to a police interrogation than a 
neutral investigation. (See Revised Appellant's Brief, pp.43-47.) Therefore the 
questions were not reasonable or well within Idaho Criminal Rule 32, but clearly indicate 
that the investigator had an agenda and was not performing and unbiased investigation. 
(See Revised Appellant's Brief, pp.43-47.) 
D. The Issue Of Whether Brian Could Have A Parent Present At the Presentence 
I nterview Was Raised Below 
Finally, in response to Brian's arguments that he should have been allowed to 
have a parent attend the presentence interview, the State asserts that this issue was 
not preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.53-58.) Although counsel below did 
not request that the presentence investigation report be suppressed because Brian's 
parents were not present, the arguments made by counsel at the time it was made clear 
Brian's parents were not going to be allowed to be present were essentially the totality 
of the circumstances test used to determine whether Miranda rights were voluntarily 
waived or a confession was voluntarily coerced. (Tr. Vol. 9, p.1936, Ls.8-16); see also 
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) (finding that although 
ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, issues that have been 
argued to or decided by the trial court, are preserved for appeal). Counsel for Brian 
stated, "I think the courts initial directive that the parents be with Brian at the time of the 
interview was well-taken and was sensitive to Brian's age and lack of experience and 
everything else." (Tr. Vol. 9, p.1936, Ls.8-16.) 
Furthermore even if the issue was not preserved, the principles behind Fifth 
Amendment waivers and voluntary confessions by juveniles justify why it is just good 
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practice to allow the parents to be present at the PSI. (See Revised Appellant's Brief, 
p.54.) This argument was raised in the Revised Appellant's Brief and is incorporated 
herein by reference. (See Revised Appellant's Brief, p.54.) 
V. 
Brian's Sentences, Particularly His Fixed Life Sentence, Constitute Cruel And Unusual 
Punishment In Violation Of The United States And/Or Idaho Constitutions Because He 
Was A Juvenile When The Offense Was Committed 
In response to Brian's arguments that his sentences, particularly his fixed life 
sentence, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and/or 
Idaho State Constitutions the State only argues that Brian's sentences "are not grossly 
disproportionate sentences and they do not shock the conscience of reasonable 
people." (Respondent's Brief, pp.59-60 & n.20.) The State did not directly address 
Brian's argument that his sentences are cruel and unusual punishment based on the 
same reasons articulated by the United State's Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005) relating to his status as a juvenile, nor did it address Brian's 
argument that even if not cruel and unusual under the United States Constitution, his 
sentences are cruel and unusual under the Idaho Constitution. 
However, after the Respondent's Brief was filed in this case, the United States 
Supreme Court found that not only could juveniles not be sentences to death because it 
was cruel and unusual punishment, but juveniles sentenced for non-homicide 
convictions could not be sentenced to a fixed life sentence because such a sentencing 
practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. Florida, _ U.S. _, 
130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010). Therefore, this issue is again being addressed in this Reply 
Brief. In the Revised Appellant's Brief, counsel noted that this case was pending before 
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the United State's Supreme Court and that it could potentially have some bearing on 
Brian's argument that his sentences are cruel and unusual. (Revised Appellant's Brief, 
p.56 n.B.) Although the Court ultimately did not address whether it was cruel and 
unusual punishment to sentence a juvenile convicted of homicide to a fixed life 
sentence, the Court again repeated many of the same rationales articulated in Roper 
and the Appellant's Revised Brief. See id generally. 
In Graham, the Court noted that this was the first time it had looked at a 
categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence and found that the gross 
proportionality test comparing the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime did 
not advance the analysis in this type of case. 'd. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2022-23. The 
Court found that when addressing a sentencing practice as applied to a category of 
offender's the appropriate analysis was that used in Roper, which looked at the nature 
of the offense and the characteristics of the offender.2 'd. 
In determining that juveniles who have committed non-homicide offenses should 
not be sentenced to fixed-life sentences, the Court noted that U[n]o recent data provide 
reason to reconsider the Court's observations in Roper about the nature of 
juveniles ... developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds." 'd. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 
2026-27. The court ultimately found that penological theory does not justify a life 
2 Ultimately, here Brian has argued both that because of his status as a juvenile his 
sentences, particularly his fixed life sentence, are cruel and unusual under the United 
State's Constitution, and that his sentences are cruel and usual applying the gross 
proportionality test applied by the Idaho State Supreme Court. (Appellant's Revised 
Brief, pp.54-61) 
13 
without parole sentence for a juvenile non-homicide offender and that fact, coupled with 
the limited culpability of juvenile non-homicide offenders, and the severity of life without 
parole sentences, all lead to the conclusion that life without parole for non-homicide 
juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2030. 
Notably, in comparing juvenile non-homicide offenders to other offenders, the 
Court specifically compared the offenders to adult homicide offenders, rather than 
juvenile homicide offenders, noting that "the age of the offender and the nature of the 
crime each bear on the analysis." Id. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2027. The Court also noted 
that a life without parole sentence is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Id. 
at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2028. The Court specifically stated that "[a]n offender's age is 
relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take 
defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed" without regard to the type 
of offense committed by the juvenile. Id. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2031. 
Finally, again the Supreme Court looked at international law in support of its 
conclusion noting that "the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the 
world over." Id. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2033-34. Although the judgments of the 
international community are not dispositive on the Eighth Amendment analysis, the 
Court found they are not irrelevant either. Contrary to the State's argument in the 
Respondent's Brief that the international law is not compelling, the Court noted that it 
has repeatedly looked beyond the laws in the United States "for its independent 
conclusion that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual. ... ". Id.; (Respondent's 
Brief, p.60, n.20.) 
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Many of the same factors looked at in Graham to find that it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to sentence a juvenile offender to fixed life, similarly apply to juvenile 
offenders who have committed a homicide offense. The fact that juveniles lack maturity 
and have underdeveloped senses of responsibility resulting in impulsive and ill-
considered actions and decisions, and that juveniles are more vulnerable and 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure, and 
that juveniles' characters or personalities are not as well formed as that of an adult, all 
support the conclusion that juveniles should not be sentenced to fixed life regardless of 
the offense. See Graham, _ U.S. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2026-28; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569-70. Additionally, penological theory also does not justify fixed life sentences for 
juveniles who have committed homicide given the juvenile's maturity is still evolving, the 
juvenile's likelihood for reform, and the fact a juvenile's characteristics make them less 
susceptible to deterrence. Graham, _ U.S. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2028-30; Roper, 543 
U.S. at 569-71. 
Furthermore, just as international law has rejected fixed life sentences for non-
homicide juvenile offenders, international law has rejected fixed life for juvenile 
offenders who commit homicide, often rejecting fixed life sentences for juvenile 
offenders as a whole. See Appellant's Revised Brief, pp.57-58, Graham, _ U.S. at 
_, 130 S.Ct. at 2033-34, Roper. The Court in Graham noted that a recent study 
concluded that only eleven nations allow life without parole for juvenile offenders under 
any circumstances, and only two of the eleven countries, the United States and Israel, 
actually impose the sentence in practice, although Israel ultimately appears to allow 
parole review for juvenile offenders serving life sentences, there are just reservations 
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about how the parole review is being implemented. Graham, _ U.S. at _, 130 
S.Ct. at 2033. Consequently, just as the United States stands alone in sentencing 
juvenile offenders to fixed life sentences for non-homicide offenses, the United States 
also appears to be the only country imposing fixed life sentences on any juvenile 
offender, including those who commit homicide. Id. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2033-34. 
Therefore, for the same reasons articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Roper, and in light of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Graham, Brian 
contends that his sentences are cruel and unusual punishment, particularly his fixed life 
sentence. 
VI. 
The District Court Abused It's Discretion When It Imposed A Fixed Life Sentence For 
Murder And A Sentence Of Life, With Thirty Years Fixed, For Conspiracy To Commit 
Murder, In Light Of Brian's Age, Potential For Rehabilitation, Remorse, And The Offers 
Of Help And Promises Of Leniency He Received From Police 
A. Introduction 
In the Revised Appellant's Brief Brian argued that the district court abused its 
discretion when it sentenced him to fixed life, for murder, and life, with thirty years fixed, 
for conspiracy to commit murder, noting his young age, his potential for rehabilitation, 
his remorse, the fact the court's finding that he will kill again is not supported by the 
record, and that the offers of help and promises of leniency he received from the police 
justify a reduced sentence. (Revised Appellant's Brief, pp.61-70.) In response the 
State argues that Brian's sentences are justified based on the egregious nature of the 
crime alone, that the district court's finding that Brian will kill again is supported by the 
record, and that the promises made by the police do not justify a reduced sentence 
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because Brian did not accept full responsibility for his actions and did not fully cooperate 
with law enforcement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.60-75.) 
Brian contends that despite these assertions by the State, his sentences cannot 
be justified by the egregious nature of the crime alone, because his age and its effects 
on his culpability and rehabilitative potential must be considered. Additionally, the 
district court's finding that Brian will kill again is not supported by the evidence and is 
inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's recent findings in Graham v. 
Florida. Finally, the State's argument that Brian has failed to fully accept responsibility 
for his actions and did not fully cooperate with police is based largely on conjecture by 
the State rather than the evidence presented below. 
B. Brian's Age And Status As A Juvenile Must Be Considered, And In This Case 
The District Court Failed To Do That 
The State argues that the egregiousness of the offense alone justifies Brian's 
sentences. (Respondent's Brief, pp.63-65.) However, when evaluating the sentence of 
a juvenile, the United States Supreme Court has now clearly established that the 
egregiousness alone of a juvenile's actions cannot justify an exceptionally harsh 
sentence without at least some consideration for his age and how his age affects his 
culpability. Graham v. Florida, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010) In Graham, the 
Court specifically stated that "[a]n offenders age is relevant to the Eight Amendment, 
and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all 
would be flawed,,3 Id. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 2031. Therefore, when evaluating a 
3 This statement also contradicts the State's argument that the rationales of Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that juveniles often make poor decisions due to 
immaturity and incomplete brain development, do not apply to this case. 
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juvenile's sentence, the defendant's age and the effect his age has on his culpability 
and overall rehabilitative potential should be considered by the courts regardless of how 
egregious the crime is. 
Furthermore, despite the State's assertion otherwise, the district court did not 
adequately consider Brian's age and the effect it had on his actions. The quotes cited 
by the State do not demonstrate the district court adequately considered Brian's age in 
mitigation when it sentenced him as the State asserts. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.65-
66.) If anything the statements cited by the State indicate that if age was considered by 
the district court, it was considered in aggravation, not in mitigation or to understand 
what effect Brian's young age had on his actions and overall culpability. (See Revised 
Appellant's Brief, pp.62-67.) Statements such as "Teenage killers perhaps should 
receive no mercy" and "this is an awful, awful situation, kids killing another kids" by the 
district court indicate that the court was not considering the Brian's age in any mitigating 
way, but was considering it in aggravation or in the sense that it made the crime more 
horrible. (See Revised Appellant's Brief, pp.63-66.) 
Therefore, because the district court focused solely on the egregiousness of the 
crime at hand, and did not give consideration to Brian's status as a juvenile and the 
effect that had, the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Brian. 
C. The District Court's Finding That Brian Will Kill Again Is Not Supported By The 
Evidence And Is Inconsistent With United States Supreme Court's Recent 
Findings In Graham v. Florida 
The State also argues that the district court's finding that Brian would kill again is 
justified by the evidence presented at trial and Brian's sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.66-70.) However, as argued in the Revised Appellant's Brief, the findings by the 
18 
district court misconstrue the findings made by Mr. Brantley and Dr. Hatzenbuelher, and 
therefore, there is no basis in the evidence for such a finding. (See Revised Appellant's 
Brief, pp.68-69.) Furthermore, the United State's Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Graham v. Florida, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), provides further support for 
Brian's argument that this finding is unfounded. 
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court stated U[t]o justify life without parole 
on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society requires 
the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of 
juveniles make that judgment questionable." _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. at 2029. The 
Court then repeated its statement from Roper that U[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption" and noted that U[a]s one court concluded in a challenge to a life 
without parole sentence for a 14-year-old '''incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.'" Id. 
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 and Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 
(Ky. 1968).) 
Here, both the evaluators stated that Brian's status as a juvenile made it hard to 
determine what his likelihood of reoffense was. (Tr. Vo1.9, p.2033, Ls.2-20, p.2041, 
L.25 - p.2042, L.1; Psychological Evaluation, pp.14, 19, 21; Appellant's Brief, pp.68-69.) 
These findings are consistent with the United States Supreme Court's findings in 
Graham and Roper that ultimately it really cannot be determined whether a juvenile can 
be rehabilitated or will reoffend at the time they are sentenced, because such a 
determination cannot be separated from the general characteristics exhibited by 
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juveniles. Therefore, the district court's finding in this case was not supported by the 
recorded, is contradictory to the statements made by Mr. Brantley and 
Dr. Hatzenbuehler, and is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's findings 
in Graham that any such finding is questionable given the nature and characteristics of 
juveniles. 
D. The State's Argument That Brian Has Failed To Accept Responsibility For His 
Actions And Did Not Fully Cooperate With Police Is Not Based On The Evidence 
But Rather On The State's Conjecture, And Is Inconsistent With Positions Taken 
By The State In State v. Adamcik 
Finally, the State argues that Brian failed to accept full responsibility for his 
actions and fully cooperate with police therefore the promises of leniency by the police 
should not be fulfilled. (Respondent's Brief, pp.70-75.) Although the fact Brian did 
provide more information at each interview throughout the investigation process is 
supported by the record, many of the arguments made by the State are not known facts 
or evidence, but the State's conjecture regarding what Brian was thinking and why he 
made certain statements or did certain things. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.70-75 
(making statements such as Brian took officers to Black Rock Canyon "somewhat 
unwittingly, after being boxed in by his latest in a series of lies to detectives that made it 
seem reasonable for him to give up that information at the time," "Having to resort to his 
latest fabrication of being merely present at the murder of [C.S.] [Brian] appears to have 
forgotten that his admission to having murdered [C.S.] was on the homemade video ... ," 
Brian "plainly realized" what detectives knew before the third interview; therefore, he 
changed his story again, and "Rather than trying to assist law enforcement, it is much 
more likely [Brian] either forgot that his comments were on the videotape or believed the 
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videotape had been destroyed by his and Ademcik's attempt to burn the evidence.") 
Notably, the conjecture by the State is conjecture made by an educated, grown adult, 
rather than anything mirroring the thought process of a sixteen year old child. 
Ultimately, throughout the interview process Brian provided more information at 
each of the subsequent interviews. (See Appellant's Revised Brief, pp.30-40; State's 
Exs. 9A, 9B, 16, & 19.) At each interview Brian was further assured by the officers and 
provided more promises of help and leniency. (See Appellant's Revised Brief, pp.30-
40; State's Exs. 9A, 9B, 16, & 19.) It is just as likely, if not more likely, the Brian 
provided more information at each interview because he was continually promised that 
officers would help him and because more implied promises of leniency kept being 
made. 
In arguing that Brian has failed to accept responsibility for his actions, the State 
also points to what it believes is "the most credible piece of evidence in this case", 
Brian's statement from the video stating, "I stabbed her in the throat. I saw her lifeless 
body. It just disappeared. Dude. I just killed [C.S.] ... " and argues that Brian has failed 
to accept full responsibility for his actions "as he did on the videotape" by actually 
admitting that he killed C.S. (Respondent's Brief, p.73.) Notably, this statement cited 
as the "most credible piece of evidence" is actually the most easily contradicted 
statement by the evidence and the State's own arguments below and on appeal. 
The evidence at trial clearly established that C.S. was never stabbed in the 
throat; therefore there was no way Brian could have stabbed C.S. in the throat. (Tr. Vol. 
9, p.1648, L.8 - p.1731, L.16.) Furthermore, although the State is certainly welcome to 
argue its theory of the case, its argument that Brian killed C.S. and has failed to accept 
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responsibility for his actions because he has not admitted to killing C.S. is completely 
contradictory to the State's theory in State v. Adamcik, that both boys were the killers of 
C.S. See Respondent's Brief, State v. Adamcik, Idaho Supreme Court No. 34639. In 
fact, on appeal in State v. Adamcik, the State has specifically argued that during the 
portion of the recording shortly before Brian's statement that he killed C.S., that Brian's 
states "We just killed C.S." and rather than that Brian killed C.S. See Respondent's 
Brief, State v. Adamcik, pp.15, 80-81. 
Therefore, Brian did accept responsibility for his actions and repeatedly assisted 
officers in their investigation. Brian's assistance, particularly in light of the offers of help 
and implied promises of leniency made by officers in this case should be considered in 
mitigation and warrant a lesser sentence. 
VII. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Brian's Rule 35 Motion In Light 
Of The New And Additional Information Presented 
In response to Brian's argument that the district court erred in denying his Rule 
35 motion the State argues that he has "failed to present any new information-nor 
could he-to show that the egregious nature of his crimes did not, by itself, justify his 
sentences." (Respondent's Brief, p.76.) This is not the correct standard of review for 
the denial of a Rule 35 motion. In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 
840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that to prevail on appeal, the defendant 
must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." Id. 
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Furthermore, even if new information demonstrating that the egregious nature of 
the crime, by itself, did not justify the sentence, is required in an adult homicide case, as 
discussed above in sections V and VI, and incorporated herein by reference, when 
evaluating a juveniles' sentence, Brian contends the court must take into account his 
age and the effect that had on his culpability, including his rehabilitative potential. See 
also Graham v. Florida, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010). Therefore, the 
egregiousness of a crime alone cannot be the only consideration when evaluating a 
juvenile's sentence and the new information presented below in support of Brian's Rule 
35 motion should be considered in mitigation in his case. 
CONCLUSION 
Brian respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case remanded 
for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests that his sentence be vacated and his case 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Finally, he requests that his sentence be 
reduced. 
DATED this 30th day of July, 2010. 
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